Marco Facchin-Clerici, Ph.D.
La Coscienza Estesa: una rassegna critica
Co Authored with Michele Di Francesco and Giulia Piredda
Sistemi Intelligenti
Quick Summary:
Il paper espone le ragioni per cui siamo scettici riguardo l'idea che la coscienza fenomenica si possa estendere.
Abstract:
Typically, materialists assume that the physical machinery of phenomenal consciousness is the brain. The extended consciousness thesis offers a materialist alternative to this position, claiming that the physical basis of phenomenal consciousness would include, at least in some cases, not only brains, but also objects outside an agent’s biological body and particular environmental inter- actions. Here we briefly review the arguments for this position, concluding that they do not offer sufficiently cogent reasons for accepting the extended consciousness thesis.
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La sfida della "fame di rappresentazione" all'anti-rappresentazionalismo
Sistemi Intelligenti
Quick Summary:
Non credo la sfida della "fame di rappresentazione" si possa coerentemente formulare. Il paper spiega al volo perchè
Abstract:
Anti-representationalist approaches to cognition typically claim that cognitive representations should be all but eliminated from cognitive scientist’s explana- tory toolkit. Representationalist greeted such a conclusion with the “representa- tion-hungry challenge”, purportedly showing that the Anti-representationalist’s eliminative conclusion lacks empirical support and that representations may even be necessary to account for certain “representation-hungry” cognitive phenomena. Here, I will respond to this challenge. I will show that, in the representationalist’s own view, the challenge fails to have any bite. For, given the representationalist’s own commitments, we have no reason to think that representations are necessary to account for “representation-hungry” cognition, or that the empirical support in favor of anti-representationalism is insufficient. In this way, I mean to dissolve, rather than face, the “representation-hungry challenge”.
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