Talk of “turns” is widespread in analytic philosophy—the linguistic turn, the cognitive turn, the naturalistic turn, and so forth. With the title of this special issue, we would like to capture an important trend that is currently emerging in the philosophy of mind. Looking back at what analytic philosophy was in the ’80s, one can clearly see that a theoretical attitude dominated the debate over minds, and in particular over mental content and intentionality. The attitude was that intentionality and content could—and should—be naturalised. That is, analysed in nonsemantic, non-mental and non-contentful terms. To use one of Fodor’s catchphrases, the zeitgeist declared that “if intentionality is real, it really must be something else” (Fodor 1987: 97). Accordingly, philosophers were called to take up the task of discovering what parts of the natural world intentionality and mental content really were. Clearly, this is not a neutral way to approach the topics of intentionality and mental content. For one thing, it assumes that intentionality and content are natural in the sense that they are “made up” by ingredients pertaining to the natural sciences. Accordingly, intentionality and content were studied from a “third-person” point of view, with little regard to one’s introspective awareness of mental contents. In addition to this methodological assumption, mental content and intentionality were also treated as self-standing. In particular, their analysis was abstracted away from phenomenal consciousness, under the assumption that this move would not result in any great loss of information about them (cf. Dretske 1983; Fodor 1987; Millikan 1984). Now, whilst some philosophers are still out looking to naturalise content (e.g. Neander 2017; Shea 2018), it seems safe to say that this kind of project has run into significant difficulties (cf. Schulte 2023), which justifies seeking for an alternative. What we are calling the “phenomenological turn” qualifies as such an alternative, one that calls into question most of the implicit assumptions made by the content naturalisation project. Within this phenomenological turn, content is no longer considered natural, in the sense that it does not need to be made up by ingredients snatched from the natural sciences’ cookbook, and consequently the task is no longer that of naturalising it. Accordingly, content and intentionality are studied and approached introspectively, from the “first-person” perspective. What is more, the deep ties between intentionality and phenomenal consciousness are highlighted (Bourget and Mendelovici 2019). Opposing standard projects of naturalisation of content, however, is not the only distinctive trait of the phenomenological turn. Interestingly, if this were the case, we might end up including strongly anti-representationalist and radically embodied views (e.g. Chemero 2009), which instead fall outside the scope of this special issue. Somewhat unsurprisingly, the missing ingredient is the focus on the phenomenological approach: content is investigated in its own terms and for its own sake, bracketing—so to speak—its relation with the natural world as it is usually understood by science. Among other things, this nicely fits with the original, Husserlian, phenomenological research project, and provides us with the reason to refer to a phenomenological turn. Needless to say, some philosophers might see themselves as taking part in this “phenomenological turn”, and yet disagree with some of the claims we have just listed. Philosophical movements are rarely crisply defined, and this makes no exception. Still, the rough characterization of the phenomenological turn we have provided should at least capture some sort of family resemblance. And, we believe, a useful one.